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THE OECD HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION 
REPORT: A RETROSPECTIVE 
AFTER A DECADE 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah* 
INTRODUCTION: TWO VIEWS OF THE OECD REPORT 
leven years ago the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (“OECD”) published its report “Harmful Tax Com-
petition: An Emerging Global Issue”1 (“OECD Report” or “Report”). 
The Report identified for the first time two problem areas facing interna-
tional income taxation of geographically mobile activities: tax havens 
and harmful preferential tax regimes.2 It sought to initiate activities to 
eliminate both types of problems.3 
Over a decade has passed, and it is now time to consider the following: 
have the OECD Report and its progeny achieved anything useful? There 
have been two recent but contradictory answers to this question. On the 
one hand, J.C. Sharman concluded in his book on tax havens that the 
OECD effort was unsuccessful: “[b]y 2002 the small [S]tate tax havens 
had prevailed, and the campaign to regulate international tax competition 
had failed.”4 On the other hand, Vaughn James argued as early as 2002 
that the policy driven by the OECD Report has “robbed . . . Caribbean 
countries of their sovereign right to determine their tax and economic 
policies.”5 
These two views obviously cannot both be true. Either the tax havens 
have prevailed, or they have been crushed. Which view is correct? This 
Article will argue in Parts I and II that, overall, the OECD effort has been 
a success. The principal ground for this argument is data showing no de-
cline in individual or corporate tax revenues in OECD member countries 
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 1. COMM. ON FISC. AFF., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HARMFUL TAX 
COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/33/1/1904184.pdf [hereinafter OECD REPORT]. 
 2. Id. ¶ 4. 
 3. See id. ¶ 90. 
 4. J.C. SHARMAN, HAVENS IN A STORM: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL TAX REGULA-
TION 1 (2006). 
 5. Vaughn E. James, Twenty-First Century Pirates of the Caribbean: How the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development Robbed Fourteen CARICOM 
Countries of Their Tax and Economic Policy Sovereignty, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2002). 
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over the past decade, in contrast with a decline in corporate tax revenues 
in non-OECD countries over the same period, as a result of tax competi-
tion among them and their failure to collect individual income taxes from 
the rich due to tax evasion. 
However, more work remains to be done, and Part III of this Article 
argues that the OECD members could advance the objectives of the Re-
port in two key ways: imposing a coordinated, refundable withholding 
tax on all payments to nontreaty jurisdictions; and strengthening tax rules 
for controlled foreign corporations (“CFCs”) to combat preferential re-
gimes in non-OECD countries. 
I. THE OECD REPORT AND ITS PROGENY6 
The original OECD Report focused on two issues. First, it identified 
“tax havens” as jurisdictions with (a) no or nominal income taxes and (b) 
at least one of three characteristics: lack of effective exchange of infor-
mation, lack of transparency, and lack of substantial activities by taxpay-
ers.7 Second, it identified “preferential regimes” as regimes offering (a) a 
no or low effective tax rate and (b) at least one of the following: ring 
fencing, lack of transparency, and lack of effective exchange of informa-
tion.8 The OECD Report condemned both tax havens and preferential 
regimes as “harmful tax competition.”9 
Following publication of the Report, the OECD began efforts to curtail 
preferential regimes in OECD member countries and to force tax havens 
to cooperate. In 2000, the OECD published a second report, focused in 
particular on how bank secrecy laws in many tax havens impeded their 
cooperation with international tax information requests.10 This report 
stated that all OECD countries should “permit tax authorities to have 
access to bank information, directly or indirectly, for all tax purposes so 
that tax authorities can fully discharge their revenue raising responsibili-
ties and engage in effective exchange of information.”11 
                                                                                                             
 6. This section is based on a 2008 report by the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommit-
tee on Investigations. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV. AFF., PERM. 
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., REPORT ON TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. 
TAX COMPLIANCE 26–29 (2008), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/071708 
PSIReport.pdf [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. 
 7. OECD REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 23. 
 8. Id. ¶ 27. 
 9. See id. ¶ 4. 
 10. COMM. ON FISC. AFF., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., IMPROVING 
ACCESS TO BANK INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES (2000), available at http://www.oecd. 
org/dataoecd/3/7/2497487.pdf [hereinafter OECD BANK INFORMATION REPORT]. 
 11. Id. ¶ 20. 
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As a result of these two reports, in mid-2000, the OECD published a 
list of thirty-five offshore jurisdictions that it planned to include in a sub-
sequent list of “uncooperative tax havens” unless the countries agreed to 
remove “the harmful features of preferential regimes” by April 2003, and 
fully eliminated taxpayers’ benefits under such regimes by December 
2005.12 Echoing the Report, in this document the OECD defined a “tax 
haven” as a country with (a) no or nominal taxation and (b) one or both 
of the following: ineffective tax information exchange with other coun-
tries, and a lack of transparency in its tax or regulatory regime, including 
excessive bank or beneficial ownership secrecy.13 
Many countries did not want to appear on either the OECD’s list of 
thirty-five offshore jurisdictions or its subsequent list of uncooperative 
tax havens. To avoid being included on the former, six jurisdictions, 
Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, and San Mari-
no, gave the OECD signed commitment letters in April and May 2000, 
promising to provide effective tax information exchange by the specified 
deadlines.14 In response, the OECD omitted these countries from the list 
of thirty-five.15 To avoid appearing on the list of uncooperative tax ha-
vens, other countries provided similar commitment letters to the OECD 
later in 2000 and in 2001, and the OECD agreed to omit them from the 
updated list of uncooperative tax havens.16  
Despite wavering support from the United States for the OECD effort, 
by 2002, twenty-eight of the original thirty-five offshore jurisdictions 
identified by the OECD had committed to offering effective information 
                                                                                                             
 12. COMM. ON FISC. AFF., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TOWARDS GLOBAL 
TAX CO-OPERATION: PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRAC-
TICES ¶¶ 4, 17–19 (2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf 
[hereinafter 2000 PROGRESS REPORT]. 
 13. Id. The OECD 2000 Progress Report did, however, omit from the definition the 
“lack of substantial activities by taxpayers,” which would have limited the ability of tax-
payers to set up pure shell corporations in tax havens. Compare id. ¶ 7, with OECD 
REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 23. For a critique of this change, see Michael C. Webb, Defining 
the Boundaries of Legitimate State Practice: Norms, Transnational Actors and the 
OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Competition, 11 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 787–827 
(2004). 
 14. See COMM. ON FISC. AFF., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE OECD’S 
PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: THE 2001 PROGRESS REPORT ¶ 17 (2001), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/28/2664438.pdf [hereinafter 2001 PROGRESS REPORT]. 
 15. See id.; 2000 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 12, ¶ 17 (excluding these six jurisdic-
tions from the list of thirty-five jurisdictions deemed “uncooperative tax havens”). 
 16. See 2001 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 14, ¶ 22 (“Since the issuance of the 2000 
Report, [five] jurisdictions have made commitments to eliminate harmful tax practices. 
They are Aruba, Bahrain, the Isle of Man, the Netherlands Antilles, and the Seychelles.”). 
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exchange in criminal and civil tax matters by the given dates.17 The result 
was that only seven jurisdictions were ultimately named on the OECD’s 
official list of uncooperative tax havens, made public in mid-2002.18 
Over time, four of the seven made the required commitments, so that, by 
2008, the OECD’s list had shrunk to just three countries: Andorra, Liech-
tenstein, and Monaco.19 To date, these three countries have persistently 
refused to provide tax exchange information with other jurisdictions in 
civil and criminal matters.20 
While it was developing the lists of offshore jurisdictions and uncoo-
perative tax havens, the OECD took a number of steps to advance global 
tax information exchange. In 2001, it established the Global Forum on 
Taxation, with participants drawn from OECD member countries and 
nonmember offshore jurisdictions, to discuss transparency and tax in-
formation exchange issues.21 In 2002, the OECD issued a model Agree-
ment on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters that States could sign 
on a bilateral or multilateral basis to meet their commitments to tax in-
formation exchange.22 In 2004, to further promote the OECD’s work, the 
G20 Finance Ministers issued a communiqué supporting the OECD’s tax 
information exchange initiative and model agreement.23 
                                                                                                             
 17. See OECD, The OECD Issues the List of Unco-operative Tax Havens (Apr. 18, 
2002), http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3343,en_2649_33745_2082323_1_1_1_1,00.html 
(listing Andorra, the Principality of Liechtenstein, Liberia, the Principality of Monaco, 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Nauru, and the Republic of Vanuatu 
as the remaining “unco-operative tax havens”). 
 18. See id. 
 19. OECD, List of Unco-operative Tax Havens, http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0, 
3343,en_2649_33745_30578809_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). 
 20. Liechtenstein, however, is currently under pressure and has agreed to cooperate 
with the OECD. See EUbusiness.com, Liechtenstein Says Must Shed Tax Haven Image, 
Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1234957621.46/ (“Liechtenstein is 
ready to work with the OECD to overcome tax fraud, as the principality seeks to shed its 
image of an uncooperative tax haven . . . .”). 
 21. See OECD, OECD Pursues a Global Dialogue on International Taxation (Oct. 1, 
2001), http://www.oecd.org/document/23/0,3343,en_2649_33745_2367319_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 22. See OECD, Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/43/2082215.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). See also 
OECD, OECD Releases Model Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters 
(Apr. 18, 2002), http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,3343,en_2649_33745_2082244_1_1_ 
1_1,00.html. 
 23. G20, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors: Communiqué, 
at 9 (Nov. 21, 2004), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/2004_germany.pdf 
(“The G20 therefore strongly support the efforts of the OECD Global Forum on Taxation 
to promote high standards of transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes 
and to provide a cooperative forum in which all countries can work towards the estab-
lishment of a level playing field based on these standards.”). 
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In 2006, the OECD issued a new report assessing the legal and admin-
istrative frameworks for tax transparency and tax information exchange 
in eighty-two countries.24 The purpose of this assessment was to help the 
OECD determine “what is required to achieve a global level playing field 
in the areas of transparency and effect exchange of information for tax 
purposes.”25 In October 2007, the OECD updated its eighty-two-country 
assessment.26 The OECD summarized its findings as follows: 
Significant restrictions on access to bank information for tax purposes 
remain in three OECD countries (Austria, Luxembourg, Switzerland) 
and in a number of offshore financial centres (e.g. Cyprus, Liechtens-
tein, Panama and Singapore). Moreover, a number of offshore financial 
centres that committed to implement standards on transparency and the 
effective exchange of information standards developed by the OECD’s 
Global Forum on Taxation have failed to do so.27 
OECD-led efforts to promote tax information exchange are ongoing. In 
March 2007, the OECD sponsored a series of meetings among more than 
one hundred tax inspectors from thirty-six countries to discuss aggressive 
tax planning schemes within their jurisdictions.28 According to top 
OECD officials, the meetings indicated that key elements in most of 
these tax dodges could be traced to tax havens.29 In January 2008, the 
OECD held discussions among its members on taking “defensive meas-
ures” against tax havens that refuse to cooperate with tax information 
requests.30 Some OECD members have also recently called for expand-
ing the list of uncooperative tax havens to include countries that, despite 
a written commitment, have failed to provide tax information upon re-
quest in criminal and civil matters.31 
                                                                                                             
 24. GLOBAL FORUM ON TAXATION, OECD, TAX CO-OPERATION: TOWARDS A LEVEL 
PLAYING FIELD (2006). 
 25. Id. at 7. 
 26. GLOBAL FORUM ON TAXATION, OECD, TAX CO-OPERATION: TOWARDS A LEVEL 
PLAYING FIELD (2007). 
 27. OECD, OECD Reports Progress in Fighting Offshore Tax Evasion, but Says 
More Efforts Are Needed (Dec. 10, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/document/48/0,3343,en_ 
2649_201185_39482288_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 28. See, e.g., Richard Highfield, OECD Meeting with Mexican Legislators on Fiscal 
Policy and Finance: Tax Administration and the Reform Process, Mar. 27, 2007, http://gaceta. 
diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/60/2007/jun/InfOCDE/Anexos.ppt/Archivo11.ppt. 
 29. See Offshore Financial Centers Playing Key Role in Aggressive Tax Plans, OECD 
Official Says, BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Mar. 27, 2007. 
 30. OECD Signals Plan to Renew Efforts Against Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions, 
BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Oct. 15, 2007. 
 31. See Testimony of Jeffrey Owens, Senate Finance Committee Hearing on Offshore 
Tax Evasion (2007). 
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II. THE DATA 
The theoretical and practical basis for the concerns expressed in the 
OECD Report is laid out in detail elsewhere,32 so I will only summarize 
it here. In the last two decades, an increasing number of countries have 
competed for inbound investment by offering foreign corporate investors 
tax holidays.33 Multinational companies can with relative ease relocate 
production facilities in response to variations in foreign tax rates. Multi-
nationals use such “production tax havens” to derive the bulk of their 
foreign income free of host country taxation.34 Furthermore, wishing not 
to damage the competitiveness of their multinational firms against multi-
nationals based in other countries, the United States and most other de-
veloped countries balk at directly taxing foreign-source business in-
come.35 If multinationals’ foreign-source income were taxed by their 
home jurisdictions, new firms would migrate towards jurisdictions that 
leave such income effectively untaxed,36 creating a regime where corpo-
rate income earned abroad would largely be free of both host- and home-
country taxation. 
For example, as a large multinational corporation, Intel Corporation 
has facilities in many countries that grant tax holidays: the company’s 
major wafer fabrication facilities are in Ireland and Israel, and it also has 
assembly lines in China, Costa Rica, Malaysia, and the Philippines.37 
Intel does not pay current U.S. tax on income from its foreign operations; 
according to U.S. law, income earned by U.S. multinationals’ foreign 
                                                                                                             
 32. For an extensive discussion, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Com-
petition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000) [he-
reinafter Fiscal Crisis]. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Bridging the North/South Divide: 
International Redistribution and Tax Competition, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 371 (2004) [he-
reinafter International Redistribution]. 
 33. See RAYMOND VERNON, IN THE HURRICANE’S EYE: THE TROUBLED PROSPECTS OF 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 32 (1998); U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVEST-
MENT REPORT 1996: INVESTMENT, TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS 
180 (1996). 
 34. See Rosanne Altshuler & T. Scott Newlon, The Effects of U.S. Tax Policy on the 
Income Repatriation Patterns of U.S. Multinational Corporations, in STUDIES IN INTER-
NATIONAL TAXATION (Giovannini et al. eds., 1993); James R. Hines, Jr. & Eric M. Rice, 
Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business, 109 Q. J. ECON. 149 
(1994). 
 35. See Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of U.S. 
International Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975 (1997). 
 36. See James R. Hines, Jr., The Flight Paths of Migratory Corporations, 6 J. 
ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & FIN. 447, 451–52 (1991). 
 37. Intel Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Dec. 29, 2007), available at 
http://media.corporateir.net/media_files/irol/10/101302/2007annualReport/common/pdfs/
intel_2007ar.pdf. 
2009] A RETROSPECTIVE AFTER A DECADE 789 
subsidiaries is taxed only after it is repatriated in the form of dividends, 
which Intel can defer indefinitely.38 Intel’s effective tax rate on foreign-
source income is therefore considerably lower than 35%, the nominal 
rate at which U.S. corporations are taxed.  
Should income derived from capital avoid the income tax net, the tax 
effectively becomes a tax on labor. In fact, as a number of empirical stu-
dies suggest, the effective tax rate on income from capital nears zero in 
some developed countries, and tax rates on capital have tended to notice-
ably decline since exchange controls were relaxed in the early 1980s.39 
Jurisdictions that had previously relied on income tax revenues must re-
sultantly supplement their tax revenue by raising more regressive taxes.  
In OECD member countries, for example, consumption and payroll 
taxes, both more regressive than the income tax, have expanded the fast-
est: as a percentage of total revenues, consumption taxes rose from 12% 
in 1965 to 18% in 1995, and payroll taxes increased from 19% to 27% 
during the same thirty-year span.40 Personal and corporate income taxes, 
however, failed to grow markedly as a percentage of total revenues be-
tween 1965 and 1995,41 the personal income tax comprising 26% com-
pared to 27% and the corporate income tax accounting for 9% versus 
8%, in these two years respectively.42 Additionally, between 1965 and 
1994, total tax revenue as a percentage of developed countries’ gross 
domestic product (“GDP”) increased sharply—from 28% to almost 
40%.43 This increase was mainly due to the increases in consumption and 
payroll tax rates.44 Evidence also suggests that as an OECD member 
economy becomes more open, taxes on labor tend to rise, but taxes on 
capital tend to fall.45 
                                                                                                             
 38. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 
TAX L. REV. 507, 517 (1997) (discussing the “Single Tax Principle” under which foreign-
source income is taxed in the residence jurisdiction at the tax rate for investment income). 
 39. See, e.g., DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR? 63–65 (1997); Jeff-
rey Owens, Emerging Issues in Tax Reform: The Perspective of an International Bureau-
crat, 15 TAX NOTES INT’L 2035, 2042–47 (1997). 
 40. Owens, supra note 39, at 2038–40. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. INT’L MONETARY FUND, TAX POLICY HANDBOOK 289–94 (Parthasarathi Shome 
ed., 1995). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Enrique G. Mendoza et al., Effective Tax Rates in Macroeconomics: Esti-
mates of Tax Rates on Factor Income and Consumption, 34 J. MONETARY ECON. 297, 321 
(1994); Enrique G. Mendoza et al., On the Ineffectiveness of Tax Policy in Altering Long-
Run Growth (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Research Discussion Paper No. 1378, 1996). Insofar as 
the income tax is placed on capital and labor, its stability may conceal this trend. 
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Similar trends may also be noted in countries that are not OECD mem-
bers or located in the Middle East. These States’ total revenues as a share 
of their GDP increased from an average of 18.8% between 1975 and 
1980, to 20.1% between 1986 and 1992.46 This growth, however, was 
principally financed through an increase in another revenue source—the 
value-added tax (“VAT”), which grew from 25.5% to 31.8% of total rev-
enues over the 1980s.47 During this same period, individual and corpo-
rate income tax revenues remained flat, or even declined.48 
A study by Keen and Simone illustrates both the extent of this problem 
and its impact on developing countries.49 Keen and Simone show that, 
from 1990 to 2001, corporate tax rates declined in both developed and 
developing countries.50 However, while in developed countries this de-
cline in the rates was matched by a broadening of the tax base, so that no 
decline in revenues can be observed,51 in developing countries, the same 
period witnessed a decline of corporate tax revenues by about 20% on 
average.52 This decline is particularly important in light of the larger 
share of tax revenues produced by the corporate tax in developing coun-
tries (an average of 17%) as opposed to developed countries (an average 
of 7%).53 Keen and Simone attribute most of this decline to the spread of 
targeted tax incentives for multi-national enterprises (“MNEs”). From 
1990 to 2001, the percent of developing countries granting tax holidays 
to MNEs grew from 45% to 58%, and similar trends can be seen for tax 
breaks for exporters (32% to 45%), reduced corporate rates for MNEs 
(40% to 60%), and free trade zones (17.5% to 45%).54 These figures are 
particularly important because a companion paper by Altshuler and Gru-
bert shows that the evolution of effective tax rates between 1992 and 
1998 seem to have been driven by tax competition, and that U.S. manu-
facturers are becoming increasingly sensitive to tax considerations in 
determining the location of their investments.55   
                                                                                                             
 46. TAX POLICY HANDBOOK, supra note 43, at 295–303, 307–12. 
 47. See id. at 5. 
 48. Id. at 295–303, 307–12. 
 49. Michael Keen & Alejandro Simone, Is Tax Competition Harming Developing 
Countries More Than Developed?, 34 TAX NOTES INT’L 1317 (2004). 
 50. See id. at 1320. 
 51. See Rachel Griffith & Alexander Klemm, What Has Been the Tax Competition 
Experience of the Last 20 Years?, 34 TAX NOTES INT’L 1299, 1301 (2004). 
 52. See Keen & Simone, supra note 49, at 1318. 
 53. Id. at 1318–21. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Taxpayer Responses to Competitive Tax 
Policies and Tax Policy Responses to Competitive Taxpayers: Recent Evidence, 34 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 1349 (2004). 
2009] A RETROSPECTIVE AFTER A DECADE 791 
However, as Griffith and Klemm point out, there is no evidence that 
tax competition had a negative effect on OECD member countries, even 
if it led them to reduce tax rates.56 In fact, in those countries, both indi-
vidual and corporate tax revenues have been remarkably stable on aver-
age from 1975 to 2006. Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP in 
OECD countries was 29.4% in 1975, and 35.9% in 2006.57 Of this, indi-
vidual taxes on income were 11.2% of GDP in 1975, and 13% in 2006.58 
Corporate taxes were 2.2% of GDP in 1975, and 3.9% in 2006.59 Thus, 
while consumption taxes account for most of the increase in tax revenue 
in the era of globalization, there is no indication that either individual or 
corporate tax revenues have gone down in OECD countries as a result of 
tax competition. 
It can be argued that these overall statistics are misleading, and that 
they represent a shift from income taxes paid by the rich on mobile capi-
tal to income taxes paid by salary earners who are less mobile. However, 
this argument does not explain the stability of the corporate tax, since 
most corporations do have the option of earning their income overseas. 
Moreover, the fact that in non-OECD countries the effects of tax compe-
tition are apparent in the data and lead to a decline in corporate tax reve-
nue suggests that there is something occurring in the OECD countries 
that prevents such a decline from taking place.60 Similarly, it is striking 
that OECD countries succeed in taxing the rich through the income tax 
far more than developing countries.61 
In my opinion, the OECD effort to curtail harmful tax competition has 
something to do with this achievement. As far as the corporate tax is 
concerned, the effort to cut back on preferential regimes in OECD mem-
                                                                                                             
 56. Griffith & Klemm, supra note 51, at 1299. 
 57. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., REVENUE STATISTICS 1965–2007, at 19 
(2008). 
 58. Id. at 20. 
 59. Id. at 21. In the EU, the trends are similar: total tax revenue was 39.6% of GDP in 
1995 and 39.9% in 2006; the implicit tax rate on capital (the most important part of which 
is the corporate tax) was 25.8% in 1995, and 33.3% in 2006, despite a decline in the cor-
porate tax rate from 35.3% in 1995, to 23.6% in 2006. See TAXATION TRENDS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (European Comm’n 2008), available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-30-08-421/EN/KS-30-08-421-EN.PDF. 
 60. This also addresses the critique that the reason corporate tax revenues are stable is 
the high profitability of corporations. Presumably, multinationals are just as profitable in 
developing countries, so without limits on preferential regimes, there would be a decline 
in profits in OECD countries as well. 
 61. See Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited 
Role of the Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627 
(2005). 
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ber countries, plus an increased vigilance on transfer pricing and a con-
certed effort to lower the permanent establishment (“PE”) threshold, 
have all prevented a decline in corporate tax revenues that would other-
wise have taken place.62 
The U.S. corporate tax shelter saga is a good indication that these kinds 
of efforts can have a real impact on the numbers. From 1993 to 2003, 
there was a surge in corporate tax shelters in the United States, the con-
sequence of which was a real decline in corporate tax revenues from 3% 
to 2% of GDP.63 In 2003 (following the Enron scandal and a Senate 
Hearing), the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) began a serious crack-
down on tax shelters, involving in particular an assault on the intermedia-
ries (i.e., accounting firms and law firms) that were essential to devising 
and marketing the shelters. The result was a remarkable recovery in rev-
enues to 4% of GDP, a level not seen since just after the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act (which significantly broadened the corporate tax base).64 
This shows that crackdowns like the OECD harmful tax competition in-
itiative can have a material effect on the macro revenue data. 
With respect to individual income taxation, the recent stories from 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland demonstrate that, despite the OECD Re-
port, there is still a lot of revenue lost to tax havens.65 The Senate Perma-
nent Subcommittee on Investigation estimated the total amount of lost 
revenue for the United States alone at $100 billion a year; other estimates 
are lower (i.e., $50 billion) but still quite high.66 However, the question is 
not how many people cheat, but how many more would have cheated but 
for the pressure on tax havens and the negative publicity generated by the 
OECD effort. In my opinion, if the OECD did not put pressure on tax 
havens, many more citizens of OECD countries would have transferred 
their funds to tax havens than the admittedly large numbers that currently 
do so. To the extent that OECD countries succeed in taxing the rich more 
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than developing countries, and all the evidence shows that they do, this is 
in large part because of efforts like the OECD Report. 
III. THE FUTURE 
Nevertheless, it is clear, and the OECD would not dispute, that the 
OECD’s current efforts are not enough. What more can be done? In the 
corporate arena the answer is clear. While tax competition among OECD 
countries is on the wane, in large part because of OECD efforts, tax 
competition continues unabated among non-OECD countries, and in my 
view that is to their own detriment.67 The obvious solution is to streng-
then the CFC rules. Since 90% or more of MNEs are headquartered in 
OECD countries, if all OECD jurisdictions abolished deferral, there 
would be no incentive for developing countries to engage in tax competi-
tion. New MNEs might be established in developing countries, but that is 
not necessarily a bad thing. The major impediment to adopting and 
strengthening CFC rules has been the fear of harming “your” MNEs in 
the face of competition from other MNEs.68 But if all OECD countries 
acted together, source-based taxation by developing countries could be 
saved with no harm to competitiveness.69 
For taxation of individuals’ income, the problem is similarly a matter 
of coordination.70 A principal problem of dealing with tax havens is that 
if even a few countries do not cooperate with information exchange, tax 
evaders are likely to shift their funds there from cooperating jurisdic-
tions, thereby rewarding the noncooperating ones and deterring others 
from cooperation. Thus, some jurisdictions have advertised their refusal 
to cooperate with OECD efforts. Recent accounts about Liechtenstein 
illustrate this point. 
However, if the political will existed, the tax haven problem could eas-
ily be resolved by rich States through their own actions. The key obser-
vation here is that funds cannot remain in tax havens and be productive; 
they must be reinvested into the prosperous and stable economies of the 
world (which is why some laundered funds that need to remain in the tax 
havens earn a negative interest rate). If the rich countries could agree, 
they could eliminate the tax havens’ harmful activities overnight by, for 
example, imposing a refundable withholding tax (e.g., at 35%) on pay-
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ments to noncooperating tax havens, or more broadly, to all nontreaty 
countries, and insisting on effective exchange of information with treaty 
countries. The withholding tax would be refunded upon a showing that 
the income was reported to the residence country. 
The financial services industry would no doubt lobby hard against such 
a step, on the grounds that it would induce investors to shift funds to oth-
er OECD member countries. However, the EU and Japan have both 
committed themselves to taxing their residents on foreign-source interest 
income. The EU Savings Directive, in particular, requires all EU mem-
bers to cooperate in exchange of information or impose a withholding tax 
on interest paid to EU residents.71 Both the EU and Japan would like to 
extend this treatment to income from the United States. Thus, this would 
seem an appropriate moment to cooperate with other OECD member 
countries by imposing a withholding tax on payments to tax havens that 
cannot be induced to cooperate in exchanging information, without trig-
gering a flow of capital out of the OECD.72 
CONCLUSION 
In the last decades of the twentieth century, there were frequent predic-
tions that the income tax would be dead in the era of globalization. The 
distinguished Canadian economist Richard Bird wrote in 1988 that “the 
weakness of international taxation calls into question the viability of the 
income tax itself. . . . If something is not done to rectify these problems 
soon, the future of the income tax is bleak.”73 Other authors wrote papers 
with titles such as, “Can Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Econo-
mies?”74 and “Is There a Future for Capital Income Taxation?”75 and I 
wrote one entitled “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis 
of the Welfare State.”76 
These obituaries for the income tax have proven premature. Within the 
OECD, income taxation is alive and well. In my opinion, part of this suc-
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cess story is due to the OECD Report and its progeny. However, there 
are serious problems in non-OECD countries, and anecdotal evidence 
like the recent Senate Report confirms the continued existence of prob-
lems in OECD countries as well. If left unchecked, the dire predictions of 
a twenty-first century world based on the VAT, while perhaps premature, 
could in time still be borne out. 
The OECD Report and its progeny represented a useful beginning. To 
complete the work, two steps are needed, both of which can be taken by 
the OECD countries if the political will exists: eliminate the ability of 
non-OECD countries to offer preferential tax regimes by eliminating de-
ferral for all CFCs, and eliminate tax evasion by OECD residents by im-
posing a refundable withholding tax on payments to nontreaty countries 
while requiring real exchange of information by treaty countries. If these 
steps are implemented, the income tax can survive well into the next cen-
tury. 
 
